The number of new bank charters in the United States has declined dramatically in recent years. From 1990 to 2008, 1,850 new banks were formed, a rate of nearly 100 per year. From 2010 to 2012 only 5 new banks were formed, a rate of fewer than 2 per year. The cause of the decline is not immediately obvious, but two leading theories -with rather different policy implications -have been put forward. Some have suggested that the decline is due to increased regulatory burden on banks -including new FDIC regulations and the 2010 Dodd Frank Act. Others have suggested that the weak economy -with its associated weak demand for banking services and low interest rate environment -are depressing bank profits. The former case may be of more concern to policymakers than the latter. This paper assesses the causes of the drop in new charter creation. We model firms' new charter decisions at the county level with an ordered probit using U.S. data from 1995 to 2012. The results suggest that a substantial portion (perhaps up to 90%) of the decline in new bank formation is attributable to the low interest rate environment and weak demand for banking services. This suggests a rather small role for the effects of increased regulatory burden on banks. It is less clear whether regulation will play a role when the economy returns to more robust state.
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Introduction
The number of new bank charters in the United States (the solid line in Figure 1 
instituted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Collectively these regulations -and uncertainty around their interpretation, enforcement, and future extension -may have depressed banking profits (and with therefore new bank supply) to inefficiently low levels.
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Other factors, however, may have contributed to the decline in new bank charters. In particular, the macro economy has been weak since the financial crisis, which has at least two relevant effects. First, the weak economy has introduced a low interest rate environment (the dotted line in Figure 1 ), which diminishes banks' ability to earn spread interest. Interest rates correlate very strongly with new entry, as seen in Figure 1 . Second, in a weak economy households and businesses may have depressed demand for banking services such as loans and deposit-taking services. If the weak economy is responsible for the decline in new charters there may be less cause for concern on the part of policymakers. A decline in banking demand is are among the most innocuous explanations for a decline in new supply.
This aim of this paper is to understand how much of the decline in new bank formation is attributable to increased regulatory burden since the financial crisis versus other observable factors such as the weak economy with its low interest rates and weak banking demand. To shed light on this question we estimate a model of new bank entry using observable, time-and geographic-varying determinants of prospective banking profit including income, GDP growth, population growth, and interest rates. We use the model to predict the level of new bank formation that would have occurred absent any regulatory changes post-crisis, and compare the model's predicted levels of bank formation to the actual level of bank formation.
We find that nearly all of the current decline in new charters is attributable to observable factors related to the weak economy, leaving little room for the role of regulation and other unobservable factors. Our results suggest that as much as 90% of the current decline in new charters is attributable to weak demand and low interest rates, leaving no more than 10% attributable to regulatory burden and other unobservable factors.
It is unclear from the model whether regulation will play a dampening role on entry once macroeconomic conditions return to healthier levels. Some specifications suggest that regulation may, 2 A prominent manifestation of these opinions was Senator Pat Toomey's comments at Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen's Senate Confirmation hearing. Senator Toomey specifically attributed the lack of new charters to increased regulatory burden in recent years and asked the future Chair to address the issue.
but these specifications predict further out-of-sample than our baseline results, so the less speculative conclusion relates to the current state of the economy.
It is worth noting that the other form of bank entry -branch expansion by existing banks into new geographic markets -has also taken a similar plunge in recent years ( Figure 2 )
Figure 2
There are two implications of this. First, the lack of new bank charters is not simply being substituted by existing bank expansion. Both are part of a common trend. 3 Second, the decline in expansionary activity would seem to confirm -or at least not contradict -the regression results suggesting that the economy (rather than regulation) is depressing prospective banking profits. Branch expansion is likely to 3 At the national, annual level, the correlation between new entry and expansionary entry is .93. 
be less affected by regulation than new charter formation is, 4 so the dip in branch expansions is consistent with the notion that non-regulatory factors are at play.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing literature on bank entry and profitability. Section 3 discusses background on new charter formation and recent trends in banking profitability. This descriptive evidence begins to sheds light on the potential sources of the compression in bank profits and the associated decline of new entry. Section 4 discusses our model of new banking entry, and Section 5 discusses the data we use to estimate the model. Section 6 describes our results, including discussions of alternative specifications and robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
Literature
The literature on new charter creation has focused largely on entry into local banking markets, the factors that lead to greater or lower probability of entry, and competitive outcomes. Since banking has been and continues to be local in geographic scope, local market conditions are generally used in the analysis. Determinants of profitability and entry used in these studies have included market growth, market concentration, and recent merger activity.
One of the earliest studies, Hanweck (1971) considered new charter formations in 1968 and 1969. He found that larger and less concentrated banking markets had significantly more charter formations.
Such a result is consistent with most models of entry, including ones with heterogeneity in cost and productivity. Other early papers include Boczar (1975) and Rosse (1977) , who focus on very restrictive samples from Florida and Texas respectively.
More recent studies that only focus on new charter formation include Seelig and Critchfield (2003) , Berger et al (2004) , and Keeton (2000) . These studies focus on new charter formations in urban markets and the effects of mergers. They find that greater merger activity is associated with greater subsequent entry. They also found that better local market demand conditions were associated with greater entry.
Two studies, Amel and Liang (1997) and Adams and Amel (2007) while we model new entry decisions (entry "deviations") on changes in profitability determinants (profitability "deviations"). They find that banks within bank types (thrifts, single market banks, and multi-market banks) compete more intensely than banks of different types.
New Charter Formation and Trends in Banking Profitability

New Charter Formation
To begin accepting deposits, banks are required to obtain insurance from the Federal Deposit Insurance 
The capital requirements for a new bank appear to depend on geography. Georgia requires $3M in initial capital; New Jersey $6M. New York, California, and the OCC appear to evaluate capital plans on a case-by-case basis, though New York indicates that it may require up to $50M in initial capital to start a successful bank in the New York City metropolitan area. 6 Once a charter is approved, it does not normally take long for a retail presence to be established. Indeed some charter-granting institutions require a physical branch to be opened shortly after a charter is granted in order to avoid charter expiration. In 2,000+ new charters in our data from the last 18 years, all new charters except for one were accompanied by a bank branch in the same year.
New charters have a number of characteristics that make them unlike incumbents ( Figure 3 ). First, new charters are significantly smaller, both by assets and deposits, than incumbents. They earn smaller margins on both their interest operations and non-interest operations, and are more likely to be a single market competitors. They have different loan portfolios, being relatively more dependent on commercial & industrial (C&I loans) rather than real estate and consumer loans. They are somewhat less likely to locate in rural areas, which is consistent with the findings of Hanweck (1971) and may be explained by a number of factors including greater growth potential.
Figure 3: Characteristics of New Charters and All Banks
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Despite entrant banks' small size they do not appear any more likely to fail than older banks. For example, during 2006 -2013, the proportion of '01-'05 charters that failed (12.2%) is not statistically different from the proportion of'96-'00 charters that failed (10.7%).
Trends in Banking Profitability
Trends in banking profitability help shed light on whether cost (regulation) or demand (demographic and interest rate) variables may be playing a greater role in diminished banking profits and thus reduced banking entry. Figure 4 charts (and provides tabular information on) the correlation between the 7 Other studies have also found differences between entrants and incumbents, both in banking contexts and in other markets. Adams and Amel (2007) find that community banks compete more aggressively than national banks do in rural markets. Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) find that competition between banks of similar types (thrift, single market, or multi market) is stronger than competition across groups, suggesting differentiation. Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) document that in certain manufacturing industries entrants are more productive than incumbents on average. 
One reason entrant banks' interest margins may be so strongly correlated with the current interest rate is that entrant banks do not have an existing stock of loans on which they collect previous periods' rates.
Incumbent banks, in contrast, receive interest payments which are, to some extent, determined by historical interest rates. In light of Figure 4 , it may not be surprising that would-be new charters are reluctant to form during low interest rate regimes. If new regulations were introducing compliance costs -such as hiring new staff, consultants, or compliance software, etc. -then we may expect to see these series rising. However, no such pattern is obvious. Incumbent banks non-interest cost to asset ratios have change little at all, and entrant banks' ratios are only slightly higher than they were in 2007. Of course regulation may work through the Error bars represent one standard deviation above and below the median.
interest margin or may not yet have taken tangible effect, but nonetheless Figure 5 shows no obvious marks of escalated regulatory burden on banks. We now turn to our model and estimation for more systematic inference on the cause of the decline in new bank charters. .
Model
Decisions by prospective entrants to apply for a new charter in a particular geographic area are determined by expected bank profits in that area. The determinants of profits are the interest rate environment, the geography's demographics (population, income, employment, etc.), changes in these demographics, regulation, and the local competitive environment. Potential entrants choose to enter a local geographic market if the profitability of doing so is greater than the profitability of not doing so, the later profitability of which is normalized to zero. The potential entrants' problem, then, is:
The choices and are, respectively, to enter or not enter market m at time t. represents a vector of local demand variables such as income, population income growth, population growth and changes in those variables. is the average federal funds rate in year t. is a vector of risk variables in a geography such as consumers' average credit scores and number of delinquencies in the particular area. is normally distributed and i.i.d. across potential entrants i, markets m, and time t.
Because firms choose to enter if , entry at the county level is observed according to:
Despite entry being a dynamic, forward-looking decision, we do not attempt to model potential entrants' beliefs over the values of future state variables. Our model corresponds to a world in which current state variables (for instance, interest rates and demographics) are sufficient statistics for firms' information on the future values of these state variables. Demographic and interest rate variables tend to change slowly and in systematic ways, so this assumption does not seem implausible to the authors.
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The model also does not model beliefs over other firms' potential entry or exit decisions. This is one possible extension of the model, but one that authors do not believe will alter the results significantly. While such a model would allow one to predict entry responses in a variety of counterfactual states of the world, it is less clear that such a model enhances inference on the cause of the current decline in new entry.
We do not include any direct measures of regulation's effect in potential entrants' profit functions. We have considered using direct measures of regulation -such as required capital ratios, pages of banking legislation, or timing of key pieces of legislation -but we judged them to be too coarse and imprecise to be useful. This is especially true because some have suggested that the current regulatory effect is not only passed legislation but also uncertainty over future extension or enforcement of legislation. In such a context it seems implausible to include regulatory regressors, and we instead draw inference on would-be regulatory effects from variation in new charters that is unexplained by other observables.
Our one attempt to directly proxy for "regulation" is by including a post-2009 dummy in some specifications, though of course this regressor could absorb any number of things that change after 2009 besides than regulation.
We model bank competition at the local geographic level. Despite the existence of national banks that compete across many geographic markets, retail banking requires proximity to a service provider for certain transactions (albeit not all transactions). Both antitrust enforcement agencies -the DOJ and the Federal Reserve Board -consider retail banking markets to be local, and all previous studies to our knowledge consider competition to occur at the local level. 8 We use the county as the level of observation in our preferred specification, rather than the slightly broader (in some cases) definitions used by regulatory authorities. We do this to take advantage of the finer data that we have for both new charters and demographics. Bank branching decisions tend to focus more on immediate service areas of the branch rather than entire metropolitan statistical areas, for example. By using counties for the new charter decision we aim to match this feature of branching decisions.
Our estimation equation is:
8 See Group of Ten (2001) for further discussion. (13) where in county m and time t is defined as (0,1) in the case of a standard probit or the number of new charters in the ordered probit case. 9 We anticipate the regression results to indicate that higher federal funds rate and more robust local demographic variables lead to greater new charter creation, while increased risk factors lead to lower new charter creation.
Data
New charter data is constructed from the Summary of Deposits (SOD) and the National Information Results change very little between the two models. Fewer than 10% of counties see any entry and fewer than 1% see multiple entrants. 10 We have pulled some market concentration data from the June 30 Call Reports which contain information such as deposits and assets for each banking entity. These data enable us to classify banking organizations by size, as well as to calculate HHIs, though we do not use HHIs in our model of entry. In calculating rural counties' HHIs, we exclude urban branches with greater than $1 billion in deposits and rural branches with greater than $500 million. We do this because banks sometimes funnel deposits into certain branches for legal or tax purposes. For example, if a large bank stores $1 billion of deposits in a small but competitive rural county, an unadjusted HHI would be a poor measure of how competitive that banking market actually is.
each county which is used to calculate population densities. We calculate annual percentage changes in population and per-capita income and annual absolute changes in population, per-capita income, and unemployment rates.
We also make use of private vendor data purchased from Equifax pertaining to credit history in each county from 1999 until 2012. This data includes the average credit scores and number of credit inquiries over the course of a year conducted by third parties on a random sample of residents. Additionally, it includes the share of each county that has at least one account which is currently 60 days delinquent as of December 31. The universe of this dataset is all people with credit history and social security numbers ending in certain digits.
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Figure 6 presents some summary statistics from the data. Recall that the interest rate variables do not vary by county, but the other variables do. 
Estimation Results
In our analysis, we estimate two specifications. In the first specification, we estimate the model using data from before Dodd-Frank (2000 -2008 We have specifications in which we use the yield curve (ten year note minus FFR), but the 10-year note itself seems to perform slightly better in predicting entry. 13 The regression results from these alternative specifications are available from the authors upon request.
predicted number of new entrants in 2006, 2007, 2008 , and in 2012 assuming no effect from regulatory change.
Focusing first on specification #1, the model predicts 159, 162, 105, and 18 new entrants (compared to actuals of 153, 159, 104, and 0). The 11% number, highlighted, represents 18/159, which is the portion of the decline in actual new charters that the model (with no regulatory effect) fails to explain. An interpretation of the 10% is that it is an upper bound on the proportion of the new charter decline left to be explained by unobserved factors which include -among other things -regulation. Such an interpretation assumes that there is no omitted variable bias, for instance past periods of low interest rates and weak demand having induced (or at least been correlated) with new banking regulations. In such a case the model would misattribute declines in new entry to rates and demand rather than regulation. Such an interpretation also assumes that the regression relationship holds near the edge of the observed sample range of interest rates. We have tried various functional forms of the interest rate (including a linear regressor which would be expected, if anything, to understate rates' effect on bank profitability) with very little change to the regression results and predictions.
In the second specification, which includes our attempt to directly proxy for regulation with a post-2009 dummy, the model still predicts a very large current decline in new charters due only to interest rates and demographic variables. It predicts that all but 11% of the current decline is being caused by the interest rate, demographic, and risk variables. However, the model also predicts that the post-2009 fixed effect itself could explain all but 11% of the current decline in new charters (assuming other regressors were set back to 2007 levels). In principle, such an estimate could be interpreted as implying that regulation will play a dampening role on new charter formation at such time as economy becomes more robust. However, this relies on an out-of-sample prediction -high interest rates and a robust economy have not been observed since the financial crisis -so it is hard to place confidence in such a conclusion.
V. Conclusion
The lack of new charter creation has been a topic of interest in the public press and a source of concern about the potential for inefficient government regulation. This paper attempts to understand which factors have led to the marked decline in new charters. Regression results suggest a very strong relationship between certain determinants of bank profits -namely interest rates and banking demand metrics -and new bank charter formation. It would appear that a substantial portion of the recent (18) decline in new bank charters may have occurred without any post-crisis regulatory changes. Our analysis points to a potential effect of the current low interest rate environment fostered by the Federal
Reserve -the deterrence of new bank entry. An assessment of the broader welfare impacts of this effect is beyond the scope of this study, but no doubt and open and important question.
